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TORTS - BOYCOTTS - REQUISITE ELEMENTS - Plaintiff was a cafeteria
operator in a small village. 1 Defendants, two storekeepers in the same village,
agreed to inform the wholesaler who supplied both defendants and the plaintiff
that they would cease trading with him if he continued to supply plaintiff. The
wholesaler acquiesced, and plaintiff's business soon failed because his sole practical
source of supply was cut off. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, defendants
moved for judgment as in the case of nonsuit, which was granted. Held, affirmed.
One of the requisites of an illegal boycott is a conspiracy. Plaintiff failed to show
coercion,2 which is an element of a conspiracy. McNeill v. Hall, 220 N. C. 73,
16 S. E. (2d) 456 (1941).
Since several well-considered cases have held an individual liable for a boycott,8 it is clear that conspiracy is not necessarily an element of the tort. 4 Inas--

1 Micaville, North Carolina, population 168 (1940). HAMMOND, NEw WoRLD
ATLAS 262b ( I 941). It does not appear that the parties involved were the only cafeteria proprietors, but that is probably a safe inference. It does appear, however, that
the wholesaler whose relations with the plaintiff were interfered with was the only
wholesaler available to the villagers.
2 Apparently the court meant that there was no threat of physical force. Coercion
as used in boycott cases was present. OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CoNFLICTS, § 409 (1927); 7 WoRDS AND PHRASES, perm. ed., 545 (1940).
8 London Guarantee &Accident Co. v. Horn, 206111. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (1904);
Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909). Although Minnesota cases
decided since 1900 present a uniformly logical and correct approach, the case of Bohn
Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. n19 (1893), contained the proposition
that an act lawful when done by an individual would be lawful when done in concert.
Though this was dictum and the case was limited to its facts in Ertz v. Produce Exch.
of Minneapolis, 79 Minn. 140, 81 N. W. 737 (1900), it is frequently cited and was
relied on in the principal case. As with many maxims, this one will sometimes lead to a
correct decision and sometimes will not. See OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
CONFLICTS 1076, 1079 (1927).
~ It is difficult to define boycott in terms of facts necessary to constitute an actionable tort. However, the gravamen of the tort is any willful interference with trade
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much as conspirators, if guilty of a crime, would clearly be liable in tort for any
injury they caused by their action,5 it would seem that the decision in the principal case amounts to a finding that boycott as an independent tort does not exist
in the jurisdiction. It is submitted that boycott cases may be rationally explained
by the presence of justification or excuse in determining their legality, and that
conspiracy as a relevant factor is important only to the extent that when it is
present a greater justification or excuse will be required. This approach avoids
the difficulties inherent in the doctrine that the legality of an act may be dependent on the motive of the actor. 6 Further, it appears that in boycott cases,
upon a. showing of the presence of a. valid excuse, the motive of the actor becomes completely irrelevant. 7 Thus an individual is free to persuade others not
relations. There are acceptable excuses for such willful interference, and the definition
should not be deemed to include "primary" boycotts. See note 14, infra. The cases
have laid down various and conflicting definitions. 5 WORDS AND PHRASES, perm. ed.
740 (1940). See OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR. AND INDUSTRIAL CoNFLICTS, §§ 409,
410 (1927), where it is demonstrated that a conspiracy theory of boycott liability is
untenable. If a conspiracy and a boycott coexist, the plaintiff might proceed on either
or both theories.
5 State v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C. 633, 49 S. E. 177 (1904) (criminal conspiracy);
State v. Dalton, 168 N •. C. 204, 83 S. E. 693 (1914) (criminal conspiracy to boycott
involving libel and slander); Swann v. Martin, 191 N. C. 404, 132 S. E. 16 (1926)
( civil action for harm resulting from criminal conspiracy to embezzle). The latter case
was relied upon by the court in the principal case for the proposition that if an act
itself is not illegal, then an agreement to do the act in concert is not illegal. This is
apparently the same doctrine referred to in note 3, supra, The other case relied on by
the court is Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 28 A. 190 (1894), where the court allowed
concerted action by employers on the ground that employees had been given a statutory
right to a concerted boycott and that it would be unfair to restrict the employers to
their common-law rights. Strikes and picketing, it should be noted, may be analyzed as
boycotts, but they are not treated as such for obvious policy reasons. HANDLER, CASES ON
TRADE REGULATION 995, note (1937).
6 Ames has analyzed some of the leading boycott cases in respect to the motive of
the actor. While it may be conceded that such an analysis is helpful in comprehending
the theory behind the law, very few cases adopt this treatment, so that the law has
not ye°t progressed to the stage where motive is a primary factor. Ames, "How Far an
Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor," 18 HARV, L.
REV. 4n (1905); 62 L. R. A. 673 (1904); Lawrence, "Motive as an Element in
Tort," 12 MAINE L. REv. 47 (1919). Cf. 28 L. Q. REv. 52 (1912); 22 CoL. L.
REv. 665 (1922). And see note 7, infra.
7 Beardsley v. Kilmer, 200 App. Div. 378, 193 N. Y. S. 285 (1922). A case
commonly cited in support ·of the motive theory \S Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., l 52
Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371 (1911), but the fact that the defendant intended to remain
in competition with the plaintiff only long enough to run him out of business would
indicate that .the real basis for decision was that his competition was not sufficiently bona
fide to operate as justification. While usually the reason for a given boycott will be the
same as an ordinary man's reason for doing such an act, cases can be put where it is
clear that the beneficence or malevolence of the motive cannot change the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the act--e.g., a banker.may be convinced that a newspaperman is working himself to death; yet if he boycott him solely to give him a well-earned rest,the
boycott is still unlawful. Also if the Ford Motor Company should decide to boycott a
man manufacturing two cars a year because he had red hair, their boycott would prob-
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to deal with his competitors,8 and he is excused for boycott on the ground that
he is thereby promoting his own "legitimate interest." 9 It is thought that the
boycotted party will be in a position to exert as much pressure on the third party
and hence negative the efforts of the boycotter. However, if several persons,
competing among themselves, should conspire to boycott another in competition
with them, competition alone is not a sufficient excuse.10 To be justified in their
boycott they must be associated for the purpose of raising the standards of their
business as a whole, or for other ends desirable from the viewpoint of public
policy. 11 Having eliminated the element of conspiracy as a controlling factor, it
would seem that the greater likelihood of harm from a boycott initiated by many
persons underlies the requirement that a greater excuse be demonstrated in this
ably be excused on the ground of competition .. If motive is immaterial in these cases,
it would seem that the existence of an objective justification rather than the presence
of a wrongful motive is the decisive factor. Compare with the last hypothetical the
"company store" cases. Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 ( 1926).
8 Dunlap's Cable News v. Stone, 27 Abbott's New Cases 28, l 5 N. Y. S. 2
(1891); Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, II 1 So. 55 (1926); Katz v.
Kapper, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 44 P. (2d) 1060 (1935). Cf. under federal legislation,
Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, (C. C. A. 3d, 1921) 271 F. 810; Federal
Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 44 S. Ct. 162 (1924).
Under New York Anti-Monopoly Statute, 19 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1941),
§ 340: Straus v. American Publishers' Assn., 85 App. Div. 446, 83 N. Y. S. 271
(1903), affd. 177 N. Y. 473, 69 N. E. 1107 (1904); Marsich v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 244 App. Div. 295, 279 N. Y. S. 140 (1935), affd. 269 N. Y. 621, 200 N. E.
27 (1936). This type of boycott will be actionable, however, if physical force is used
or threatened, or if an independent tort, such as libel, slander, or inciting to break a
contract, is committed. OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CoNFLICTs, § 415
(1927); State v. Dalton, 168 N. C. 204, 83 S. E. 693 (1914)·.
9 It is uncertain what constitutes sufficient "legitimate interest," other than the
right to compete, to operate as an excuse. See International & G. N. Ry. v. Greenwood,
2 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 21 S. W. 559 (1893), holding that the avoidance of wage assignments to the plaintiff who had previously brought harassing suits was not sufficient.
10 Ertz v. Produce Exch. of Minneapolis, 79 Minn. 140, 81 N. W. 737 (1900).
For concise statements of this rule, see Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E.
1077 (1896); Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171,. 97 N. W. 663
(1903); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 44 S. Ct. 96 (1923) (under
federal legislation).
11 Ware & De Freville v. Motor Trade Assn., [1921] 3 K. B. 40, noted in 31
YALE L. J. 539 (1922); United States v. American Livestock Commission Co., 279
U.S. 435, 49 S. Ct. 425 (1929); Gladish v. Kansas City Line Stock Exch., 113
Mo. App. 726, 89 S. W. 77 (1905); Wolfenstein v. Fashion Originators Guild of
America, 244 App. Div. 656, 280 N. Y. S. 361 (1935) [held a lawful association
under New York Anti-Monopoly Statute, 19 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1941),
§ 340]. But see Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission,
312 U.S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 703 (1941) (held unlawful under federal legislation), noted
in 89 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 987 (1941). See, however, Anderson v. United States, 171
U.S. 604, 19 S. Ct. 50 (1898), in accord with the rule stated. Although no case was
found which went off on the point, it may be suggested that a legitimate trade association's boycott may be justified in many instances because the person boycotted could
have become a member had he so desired. This would indicate that if the boycotted
person had been arbitrarily excluded from membership, the boycott would not be so
easily justified. ·

1276

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

case. But despite the fact that ordinarily more harm will result from a conspiracy to boycott than from a boycott initiated by an individual, it must be
admitted that the decided cases do not stress this fact. 12 Likelihood of harm
must derive its relevancy as a rationale from the results of decisions and not
from the opinions themselves. The importance of this factor is borne out, to a
lesser extent, by the distinction between primary and secondary boycotts. 13 The
words "primary" and "secondary" refer to the person whose trade relations are
disrupted. Thus, if the boycotter alone refuses to continue dealing with the boycotted party, the boycott is primary, while if he succeeds in disrupting the relations between the boycotted party and third parties, the boycott is secondary.
While it is not impossible for a primary boycott to be more harmful than a
secondary boycott, usually the latter will be more harmful. It follows therefore
that an individual needs virtually no excuse for laying down a primary boycott,
since he has a fundamental right to decide with whom he will do business.1 4
In applying these principles to, the instant case, it is apparent that the boycott
here was secondary in nature. Here the third party, whose trade relations with
the plaintiff were interfered with, controlled the entire source of supply. If one
of the defendants, acting as an individual, had attempted a boycott, the wholesaler would have had a real choice between retaining the trade of the plaintiff
and that of the boycotter, and the plaintiff would have a fair chance of peing
the party favored. However, since the wholesaler was faced with retention of
two-thirds of his business as against one-third, his action would inevitably be
unfavorable to the plaintiff. Thus the decision in the principal case is unfortunate; and in declining to recognize the boycott as an independent tort, the
court adopts a view which is decidedly in the minority.15

Louis C. Andrews, Jr.
12 Some support for this position will be found in Montgomery Ward v. South
Dakota Retail Merchants' Assn., (C. C. S. D. 1907) 150 F. 413, where the boycott
was found was lawful; although the plaintiff was a single corporation and the defendants a group, their strength was practically equal.
18 OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS § 408 (1927).
14 Cases which involve a true primary boycott are very rare, and the law regarding
them is correspondingly doubtful, though probably such a boycott would not in general
be actionable. The reason for the rarity of cases would appear to be that a serious and
effective boycott will nearly always be secondary. Often boycotts which appear to be
primary are cases where the boycotted party acts in a dual capacity, e.g., a wholesaler
_who does some retail trade. See Cases and notes, HANDLER, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 986-1003 (1937). Also it might appear that the interference with the person
with whom the boycotted party deals is in itself a primary boycott. A decision in such
a case would be influenced by a different question, viz., the extent to which a third
party may recover for injury incidentally caused by a tort directed at another.
15 Whether any other type of action would avail the plaintiff in the principal case
is doubtful. Although an early case under the Sherman Act seemed to indicate that a
substantial effect on interstate commerce might bring the boycott within the act, Gibbs
v. McNeeley, {C. C. A. 9th, 1902) II8 F. 120, the more recent cases show the contrary tendency. Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349, 61 S. Ct.
580 (1941), noted in 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 985 (1941). In some respects the North
Carolina Anti-Trust Act, N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935), § 2559, is broader than
the New York statute, 19 N. Y. Consol. Laws {McKinney, 1941), § 340, but it has
received a very narrow interpretation in respect to civil actions.

